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Abstract. Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability of an agent to rep-
resent mental states of other agents including their intentions, desires,
goals, models, beliefs, how the environment makes an impact on those
beliefs, and the beliefs those agents may have about the beliefs others
have about themselves. Integrating artificial ToM in automated negoti-
ations can provide software agents a key competitive advantage. In this
work, we propose integrating ToM into context-aware negotiation agents
using Bayesian inference to update each agent’s beliefs. Beliefs are about
the necessity and risk of the opponent considering hypothesis about how
it takes into account contextual variables. A systematic hierarchical ap-
proach to combine ToM with using evidence from the opponent actions
in an unfolding negotiation episode is proposed. Alternative contextual
scenarios are used to argue in favor of incorporating different levels of
reasoning and modeling the strategic behavior of an opponent.
Keywords: Theory of Mind, Negotiation Agents, Context Awareness,
Bayesian Models
1 Introduction
In the struggle for survival, humans were forced to compete and cooperate with
others in the common environment they inhabit. Over the years, this need has led
to the emergence of highly competitive environments where each individual must
interact strategically with its pairs in order to accomplish its own goals, which in
turn made environments even more complex. Strategic behavior in interacting
socio-technical systems demand the development of increasingly sophisticated
decision-making skills that required humans and software agents to reason about
the strategies of other agents they interact with, to reason about how others
reason, what do they think others know they know and think, and so on and so
forth. This recursive type of mental reasoning about others has gained a lot of
attention lately, and is usually referred to as Theory of Mind, or ToM.
Theory of mind denotes the ability to represent the mental states of others,
including their beliefs, intentions and goals [2, 16], which can be used advanta-
geously over shallower ways of reasoning [15]. This ability was found at first in
humans, but it is also present in other species [7], which led to the possibility
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of implementing it in machines and artificial software agents [12, 13]. Recent re-
search efforts have demonstrated ToM effectiveness at large [3, 4, 10, 17, 19], in
a number of approaches according to Qi et al. [11], and these works seem to be
the tip of the iceberg to further learning and reasoning in multi-agent systems.
Although most previous studies are focused in games as Colored-Trails [3],
Common Pool Resource Games [18], Rock, Paper, Scissors and its variants [4]
and in Game-Theoretic approaches, they address, at least partially, the nego-
tiation problem [6]. However, to the best of our knowledge, there exists just a
handful of works that combine the negotiation and its context [14, 20], and cer-
tainly none of the previous research efforts in the area of autonomous agents use
ToM to predict other parties thoughts about others, to decide their next offers
given the context and other agents beliefs and models.
There are three major contributions in this work. The first contribution is
related to the use of theory of mind applied to negotiations that take the context
into account, where agents will try to identify the intentions of their opponents
through their offers and the use of a the Bayes rule to update an opponents
beliefs. The second contribution is the use of private deadlines for each nego-
tiation agent during a negotiation episode. In the literature about automated
negotiation is it is assumed that the deadline is the same for both agents and
is public knowledge. The third contribution is addressing most of the challenges
and difficulties that ToM brings into automated negotiations when combined
with identifying key contextual variables which are used to update prior beliefs
from sparse data in a negotiation episode.
To begin with, an introduction to automated negotiations and the negotiation
setting is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, the concept of theory of mind is
described together with a group of ToM context-aware negotiation agents with
increasing orders of sophistication. To continue with, in Section 4, a number of
computational experiments made are discussed. Some concluding remarks about
our research efforts in implementing ToM in automated negotiations are made
in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, future research avenues are presented.
2 Negotiation Setting
A number of approaches to address the problem of automated negotiations has
been taken. The works of Fatima et al. [5] and Baarslag [1] made up a com-
pendium of the state of the art in automated negotiations. In [5], differences
between single and multiple issues, bilateral and multilateral negotiations are
discussed, with discrete and continue values for the attributes of the issues be-
ing negotiated. Machine-machine and man-machine negotiations are addressed,
as well as different negotiation protocols, domains, and negotiation agendas.
In [1], different techniques for offering, accepting, and opponent modelling are
presented, alongside a framework to develop negotiation software agents.
A group of negotiation parties that agree to negotiate over a certain issue
is considered in this work. According to [8], negotiation parties are the agents
that participate in different negotiation episodes, and issues are the resources
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to be allocated or the terms of agreement to be addressed during a particular
negotiation episode. In this work, the same considerations will be used. The
mechanism of bilateral negotiations between two agents taking actions seeking
to agree about one single issue with discrete values using a discrete time line.
The alternating-offers protocol [9] is used throughout.
During a bilateral negotiation of an issue, the two negotiation agents will
make offers and concessions between an initial price and a reserve price, as
shown in figure 11. The initial price (IP ) is the first offer made by a given agent
in the negotiation episode. The reserve price (RP ) of a negotiation agent is the
ultimate offer that agent is willing to accept. Note that every offer outside this
zone of agreement is detrimental to any concerned agent. Clearly, in a buyer-
seller negotiation, a deal can only take place if the reserve price of the buyer
is greater than the reserve price of the seller. In this situation, the zone of
agreement of a negotiation episode is determined by the reserve prices of both
agents involved.
Fig. 1: Zone of agreement in a negotiation episode between two agents A and B.
In this work, the main assumption is that the initial price IP for each agent
is private information, as well as its negotiation deadline, which will be named n.
However, the fact that this deadline is private to each agent forces both agents
to consider not only their private deadlines while negotiating, but also to reason
about which would be their opponent’s deadline.
One of the most novel aspects of our work is the negotiation context, and how
do agents consider it. A colloquial definition of the negotiation context can be
found in [14], in which the negotiation context is presented as the characteristics
or circumstances under which the negotiation process occurs. More formally, in
this work the context is represented by two abstract spaces: the agent’s private
information and the contextual variables which are assumed common knowledge.
An agent’s private information is composed by all his internal or private vari-
ables, those that other agents cannot see but could attempt to model observing
the actions the agent takes. The private information can refer to the needs or
urgency of a factory to buy supplies due to low inventory and high demand,
the rush of a family to buy a bigger car, or the urgency of a brand to avoid
1 Adapted from [20].
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bankruptcy. The necessity that an agent has given this private information will
be summarized in a single variable ν, that varies between 0 and 1.
The negotiation context, on the other hand, is composed by all the external
or public variables, those that every agent would access if deemed necessary.
The public information may refer to changes in global currencies, variations in
the weather forecast when selling wind energy, or particular events as the fall
of a government leader. The risk that an agent internally perceives given this
publicly available information will be summarized in a single variable ρ, that
varies between 0 and 1.
3 ToM-Context-Aware Negotiation Agents
In this section, the proposed design for our ToM context-aware agent is pre-
sented, together with a short introduction to the concept of theory of mind. Fol-
lowing the definition given by Singer et al. [16], Theory of mind, or the equivalent
term “mentalizing”, connotes an agent’s ability to cognitively represent the men-
tal states of others, including intentions, knowledge, desires, goals, beliefs, and
models. This ability combined with purposefully deceiving and manipulating op-
ponents’ thoughts could provide agents with a social competitive advantage, as
discussed in [4]. In this work, it is argued that by mentalizing and using Bayesian
inference about opponents’ strategies (and their contextual-driven models) dur-
ing a negotiation episode may provide a competitive advantage for maximizing
an agent’s utilities. This approach differs from the works of Fatima et al. [5]
and Baarslag [1], primarily because they concentrate in ToM-0 agents, where
no opponent’s models are used, and ToM-1 agents, where agents suppose that
others do not have the ability to mentalize about themselves.
Fig. 2 will serve us to explain how ToM works. Suppose there are two agents,
A and B, negotiating in a certain environmental situation or context. As a ToM-
0 agent, agent A models the negotiation context but does not explicitly take into
account or model the other agent’s behavior, for instance B, during a negotiation
episode. In other words, agentA only perceives the effect of agentB’s actions, but
does not model this agent as an entity capable of reasoning about its opponent’s
actions or the influence of contextual variables on the opponent’s behavior. As
a ToM-1 agent, A distinguishes the presence of a situated negotiation agent as
if it were a ToM-0 agent and model the negotiation context as immutable to
actions taken by both negotiating agents. That is, agent A models agent B as
if the latter were aware of the context and its contextual variables but could
not consider how this context impacts on A itself. In the same way, a ToM-2
A would model B as if it were a ToM-1 agent, and so it continues. In general,
a ToM-m A would model B as a ToM-m-1 agent. The ToM level of A will be
represented by mA.
As previously described in Section 2, the influence of the negotiation context
on each agent will be modeled by two variables, ν and ρ. Then, our agent will use
these variables to adapt its negotiation strategy using Bayesian ToM modeling
of its opponent including beliefs, desires, intentions and preferences.
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Fig. 2: Theory of mind explained.
It is worth highlighting here that one of the challenges for negotiation agents
with levels of ToM higher or equal than 1 is to be aware that they cannot wait
until their private deadlines to concede more. This is because private deadlines
of their opponents may be shorter than theirs, and sticking to their own deadline
can result in an unfavorable or unexpected negotiation outcome.
3.1 A ToM-0 Negotiation Agent
Adapted from Fatima et al. [5], a heuristic concession strategy for a ToM-0
negotiation agent A is defined as follows:
OAt = IP + (RP − IP ) ∗
(
t
n
)1/β
(1)
where Ot is the offer agent A will make at time t, IP is the initial price, which is
assumed to be the best deal an agent considers it can obtain from the negotiation,
RP is the reserve price, which is the worst deal the agent may accept at the end
of an episode. Finally, t is the time elapsed from the beginning of the negotiation
episode, n is the agent’s deadline, and β defines the concession rate, that is, how
much a given agent would concede during the negotiation.
As previously said in Section 2, IP and n are assumed private information
for each agent, and t will advance as the negotiation episode proceeds. RP and
β will depend on the context, as equations 2 and 3 show:
RP = 1.0− ν (2)
β = 1.5 ∗ (1.0− ρ) + 0.5 (3)
This simplified negotiation strategy will suffice to prove the potential of re-
sorting to an Artificial ToM and Bayes rule for modeling opponents behavior in
automated negotiations and taking key contextual variables into account.
The acceptance strategy to be used by an agent A is taken from Baarslag [1].
A will accept an offer from B if the following acceptance condition is verified:
u(OBt−1) ≥ u(OAt ) (4)
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where u(Oagentt ) is the utility A will obtain from the offer O made by agent at
time t. The efficacy of this rather simple acceptance strategy was demonstrated
in [1], and consists of the acceptance of an offer from an opponent whenever
such offer supposes a higher utility for agent A in comparison with the utility it
would obtain from its own next offer.
The utility of every agent for an offer Ot will be given by:
u(Ot) =
{
Ot −RP if A is seller
RP −Ot if A is buyer (5)
At the end of a negotiation episode, the offer used to compute the utilities for
both agents will be the last offer made by the agent which ended the negotiation.
3.2 A ToM-1 Negotiation Agent
A ToM-1 agent A, as mentioned before, will model any other agent B as if
it were a ToM-0 version of itself. Accordingly, this ToM-1 agent A will make
some hypothesis about its opponents’ behavior. The first hypothesis is that the
opponent agent B resorts to the same public information as agent A does. In
that sense, it models the risk ρB of B as 1 - ρA, that is, its own perceived risk
if it were agent B. The second hypothesis is that agent B would negotiate as
itself would do in a given context. With these two considerations in mind, agent
A will model agent B’s responses to its offers during the negotiation episode. As
ρB is modeled directly from the knowledge agent A has about how the context
influences its necessity and risk, agent A will try to model νB and nB based on
agent B’s offers.
Agent A resorts to Bayesian inference [2] to update its predictions about
νB and nB through the Bayes’ Rule which changes prior beliefs agent A has as
shown in Eq. 6.
P (H|E) = P (E|H) ∗ P (H)
P (E)
(6)
In this sense, the new evidence E that makes possible for agent A to update
its beliefs about its opponent’s desires and contextual model are agent B’s offers,
and the revised beliefs H that A has about its opponent are agent B’s necessity
νB and deadline nB . Note that the agent A has a prior belief about B’s param-
eters νB and nB . Initially, this is an uniform distribution, that is, every possible
combination of νB and nB is considered as equally likely. As the negotiation
episode proceeds, this prior distribution is updated based on the offers received,
discarding those combinations or hypotheses that have negligible probability of
occurring given received data from the previous offers made by agent B in the
negotiation episode. While A tries to model B, it will make no concession, as if
its νA where equal to 0.0 (unless its deadline is close enough). When A thinks it
has enough informative beliefs about the situation agent B is in, it will concede
as little as it can, trying to force an agreement at the reserve price of B, RPB .
If agent A is not too confident about the beliefs it has regarding the risk and
necessity of its opponent, it behaves simply as a ToM-0 agent, given its context.
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3.3 A ToM-m Negotiation Agent
The recursive notion behind ToM may go up towards any level of abstraction m.
However, modeling thoughts and the way of behaving of other agents becomes
more and more elaborated, and the assumptions made about their thoughts, and
what the others think about our own thoughts, require more precise models as
ToM levels of reasoning are more abstract and self-referenced.
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode of a ToM-m context-aware negotiation agent A
Data: necessity νA, risk ρA, deadline nA, ToM-level mA, initial price IPA
Result: negotiation outcome
1 begin negotiation episode;
2 for i← 1 to mA do
3 initialize ToM-i Bayesian model of B with uniform priors of ν and n;
4 send first offer IPA;
5 for t← 1 to nA do
6 receive offer OBt−1;
7 for ToM Bayesian models of B do
8 update priors of νB and nB given evidence OBt−1;
9 if there is only one ToM-m model that explains νB and nB then
10 if nB ≤ nA then
11 νA ← 1− νB and nA ← nB ;
12 else
13 compute νA so that OAnA equals O
B
nA ;
14 if νA ≥ νAt=0 then
15 play ToM-0 strategy: νA ← νAt=0 and nA ← nAt=0;
16 else if there is more than one ToM-m model that explains νB and nB
then
17 play a deceitful strategy varying νA and nA;
18 else
19 play ToM-0 strategy: νA ← νAt=0 and nA ← nAt=0;
20 compute new offer OAt given ν
A, ρA, nA, t, IPA;
21 if u(OBt ) ≥ u(OAt+1) then
22 accept last offer made by B;
23 negotiation episode ends;
24 else
25 send offer OAt ;
26 for ToM Bayesian models of A do
27 update priors of νA and nA given evidence OAt ;
28 reject last offer;
29 negotiation episode ends;
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In Algorithm 1, a pseudocode of the behaviour for the proposed ToM-m
context-aware negotiation agent A during an episode is presented, given its in-
ternal need or urgency νA, perceived risks ρA, private negotiation deadline nA
and initial price IPA.
To make the rationale behind Algorithm 1 more clear, some remarks are
given. In lines 7 and 8, models of agent B are updated. Suppose the case of a
ToM-4 agent A. To achieve such a sophisticated level of mentalizing, agent A
needs to revise the model ToM-1 B has about ToM-0 A and the model ToM-3
B has about a ToM-2 A. In the same way, in lines 26 and 27, models of agent
A are updated. A will update the model ToM-2 A has about ToM-1 B and the
model ToM-4 A has about a ToM-3 B. In these lines, the complexity of recursive
modelling can be seen, and the reader can have a glimpse of the problems an
incorrect model in the lower levels of ToM may give rise to in the accuracy of
the whole mental model of the opponent.
Perhaps the key issue in this algorithm can be found in line 17 where, if
agent A has not yet been able to identify the strategy B is using, it will play a
deceitful strategy as an incentive for B to show its true type, that is, the true
values νB and nB .
Agent A may decide to return to a basic strategy, namely its 0 level of ToM,
for two different reasons. The first one is in line 15, whenever agent A deduces
that, given νB and nB and its own νA and nA, there is no way an agreement can
be reached. The second reason is in line 19, where A understands it has failed
to identify agent B’s strategic profile, and plays a conservative strategy ToM-0
so as not to concede beyond what is strictly necessary. Finally, in lines 21 and
22 the acceptance condition mentioned in equation 4 is presented.
4 Computational Experiments and Results
4.1 Experimental Design
A number of negotiation episodes has been made; each of them considers a
different context, where agents will apply different levels of ToM. The contexts
are formally defined by different values of necessity and risk for both agents as
shown in Table 1.
Context νA ρA nA νB ρB nB
1 0.1 0.3 20 0.7 0.7 20
2 0.5 0.5 10 0.5 0.5 15
3 0.5 0.5 15 0.5 0.5 10
4 0.6 0.2 25 0.6 0.8 10
5 0.8 0.8 10 0.7 0.2 20
Table 1: The different contexts in which agents A and B are to negotiate.
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As said before, there is a single issue under negotiation, and the initial price
IP for each agent is assumed as given. Two agents are considered for the nego-
tiation episodes, A and B. Agent A wants to negotiate a price for this issue with
the owner, agent B. While the initial price for A, IPA, is 0, IPB is equal to 1000,
for every negotiation episode. On this basis, the influence of different contexts
on the mental models used for taking actions could be properly compared.
4.2 Results
Context 1
Figure 3 depicts the negotiation episodes played between A and B in the
context 1, considering that both agents may use different levels of ToM.
Fig. 3: Negotiation episodes conducted in context 1 with ToM agents.
In this first context, there is not too much to do for these agents, as the
reserve price of the seller B is greater than the reserve price of the buyer A. This
means that the necessities of A to buy the issue are not so high, and the true
necessity that B has to sell is not high enough. For this context, thus, there is no
agreement zone: every possible agreement is detrimental to at least one of the
negotiation agents. Hence, using ToM does not provide any advantage in such a
context, as can be seen from Fig. 3(a) through Fig. 3(d).
Context 2
Figure 4 summarizes actions taken by both agents in the negotiation episodes
played in context 2, considering they use different levels of ToM.
In this second context, agent A and agent B consider that the issue being
negotiated has a RP of 500, given their necessities. This is a special case, where
the only possible agreement is that both agents concede until their RP .
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Fig. 4: Negotiation episodes conducted in context 2 with ToM agents.
It will be shown that the use of ToM in this context helps negotiation agents
reach an agreement as they understand that the other party also has a nego-
tiation deadline. In Fig. 4(a), none of the agents use ToM, in which case their
negotiation strategy is just to concede according to their internal needs ν and
risks ρ. In Fig. 4(b), agent A infers that B has a certain deadline, but it cannot
do anything more than conceding to its RP , because its own deadline is closer
to the actual time t. In other words, it is B’s problem that the negotiation had
not reached an agreement. In 4(c), B can model A as a ToM-1 agent and model
its deadline nA, and they can finally reach an agreement by accepting their RP .
Context 3
Figure 5 shows the negotiation episodes conducted in context 3. This context
is quite similar to context 2, with the exception that agentA has a longer deadline
than agent B. As a result, as shown in Fig. 5(b), as soon as agent A properly
infers this situation, it can adjust its own deadline to reach an agreement.
Fig. 5: Negotiation episodes conducted in context 3 with ToM agents.
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Context 4
Figure 6 shows the negotiation episodes conducted between A and B in
context 4. In this context, ToM plays an interesting role. In Fig. 6(a), when
both agents negotiate according to their necessities and risks, they do not reach
an agreement, despite there is an agreement zone where both agents can win if an
deal is reached. In Fig. 6(b), ToM-1 A adapts its strategy to reach an agreement
while using Bayesian inference to model the need of B and its deadline.
Then, in Fig. 6(c), ToM-2 B interprets that A is trying to model its actions.
For that reason, B deceives A by playing as if its internal need was lower than
it really is. Then, when A thinks that its best choice is to concede until RPA, B
adapts its strategy to concede accordingly. Finally, in Fig. 6(d), as A interprets
that B is a ToM-2 agent, it waits until B models its deceitful strategy and reveals
its RP . Just then, A concedes until RPB .
Fig. 6: Negotiation episodes conducted in context 4 with ToM agents.
Context 5
Figure 7 depicts the negotiation episodes conducted between A and B in
context 5. In this last context, the benefits of using ToM are undeniable, as it
plays a crucial role during the negotiation episode. This is a novel situation in
which, even when agents play the strategy suggested by their necessities and
risks, agreement takes place, as shown in Fig. 7(a).
In Fig. 7(b), ToM-1 A interprets that B behaves as a ToM-0. In this case,
there is no much for A to do, more than to model its opponent and concede,
taking into account that its deadline is possibly shorter than B’s. For this reason,
it cannot wait until B reaches RPB : agent A estimates the last offer B is going
to make in time nA and concedes until that offer is made. B can surpass that
constraint in Fig. 7(c) because, according to its model, A has less time than itself
to negotiate, and thus should concede faster until RPA. Finally, in Fig. 7(d), A
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Fig. 7: Negotiation episodes conducted in context 5 with ToM agents.
knows that B makes a ToM-1 model. For that reason, A deceives B and forces
it to concede a little more. It is worth noting that B obtains a better outcome
in Fig. 7(b) than in Fig. 7(d), despite in the latter it uses a higher level of ToM.
5 Concluding Remarks
Theory of mind constitutes a set of social skills that allows agents to reason
about the world they inhabit, to reason about how others reason, what do they
think others know they know and think, and so forth. These social skills provide
agents desirable abilities when interacting with others, abilities that can increase
their utilities when competing and cooperating.
In this work, the role of ToM in automated negotiations between context-
aware agents was addressed. After a number of negotiation episodes conducted
in different contexts, the importance of understanding this recursive modelling
technique (taking into account the models others made out of the context and
their pairs) was highlighted.
Some problems remain open, though, in this new research area. The first
problem is the assumptions an agent makes when modelling others. For instance,
if B does not act the way a ToM-1 A imagines or assumes B should act in a
given context, then the model of this ToM-1 agent fails, and further levels of
ToM will inevitably fail as well. In the same manner, the assumption of A that
B has a similar way of modelling the world that it does can be misleading. For
instance, if the risk B perceives is different to the risk A thinks B perceives,
then the model A uses to take actions fail. This first problem is concerned with
the difficulties of correctly modelling the world and the opponents.
The second problem is about the incorrect interpretation of the level of ToM
used by the opponent. If the agent A does not make the right assumptions about
the reasoning deepness that the agent B makes of itself, then A’s actions may
be detrimental. Figure 8 highlights this problem in context 5. In (a), A uses
a level of ToM exceedingly high, performing even worse than it would do by
using no ToM at all, as no agreement is reached. In (b), A uses the same level
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of ToM as B, but B takes far from optimal decisions. It is worth noting that
A performs better here than in 7 (d), when it uses the “correct” level of ToM,
m = 3. In 7 (d), B reckons that its ToM model fails to deliver, and resorts to
its ToM-0 strategy. In 8 (b), B correctly identifies the deadline of A, nA, but
incorrectly identifies its RPA, and it is not aware of such an error. In this case,
A was benefited by the confusion of B, but the same confusion may happen
to A itself in other contexts. This second problem illustrates the difficulties of
correctly identifying the right level of ToM used by the opponent.
Fig. 8: Negotiation episodes conducted in context 5, where a ToM agent fails in identi-
fying the ToM’s level of its opponent. In (a), ToM-3 A fails to model its opponent as
a ToM-1. In (b), both agents A and B fail to model their opponent’s ToM’s level.
Despite some drawbacks, the correct use of ToM can help a negotiation agent
to increase its utilities, as it is proven in this work. Further research is needed in
order to overcome the mentioned problems, but the simulation results highlight
that contextual models and ToM can be profitably integrated with Bayesian
inference in automated negotiations.
6 Future work
Besides overcoming the problems mentioned above, there are a number of re-
search lines to follow from now on. To begin with, the use of ToM could be ap-
plied in series of negotiation episodes rather than in a single negotiation episode.
Keeping a history of past negotiations could help agents to better capture the
level of ToM of other parties, as well as their true necessities and risks.
Another possible line of research is the use of ToM to explain why a certain
deal or proposal occurs. This opens new opportunities to make automated nego-
tiations richer and gives agents a cognitive ability with the possibility to explain
their actions and own behaviour.
Finally, this work could be extended to contemplate man-machine negotia-
tions in order to understand why people decide to bargain or not in different
contexts and under various situations.
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